Visualizing Probabilistic Proof by Guerra-Pujol, Enrique
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
VISUALIZING PROBABILISTIC PROOF 
 
ENRIQUE GUERRA-PUJOL∗ 
ABSTRACT 
The author revisits the Blue Bus Problem, a famous thought-
experiment in law involving probabilistic proof, and presents Bayesian 
solutions to different versions of the blue bus hypothetical. In addition, the 
author expresses his solutions in standard and visual formats, that is, in 
terms of probabilities and natural frequencies. 
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When the facts change, I change my opinion. What do you do sir? 
—John Maynard Keynes1 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF PROBABILISTIC PROOF 
What role should mathematics and mathematical reasoning play in 
law? Specifically, when should judges and jurors use “probabilistic proof” 
to infer a defendant’s guilt or innocence at trial? 
Courts have generally rejected the use of probabilistic proof for 
identification purposes in both civil and criminal cases.2 In the eloquent 
words of one jurist, “Mathematics, a veritable sorcerer in our 
computerized society, while assisting the trier of fact in the search for 
truth, must not cast a spell over him.”3 Legal scholars, however, are deeply 
divided on this question.4 Broadly speaking, the critics of probabilistic 
proof point to the dangers of probabilistic methods of adjudication. The 
proponents of probabilistic reasoning in law, in contrast, emphasize the 
dangers of not using such probabilistic methods.5 In this Article, we shall 
 
 
 1. As quoted in Sharon Bertch McGrayne, The Theory That Would Not Die. New Haven: Yale 
University Press (2011). 
 2. See, e.g., People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33 (1968); Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 58 N.E.2d 754 
(1945). 
 3. Collins, 438 P.2d at 33. 
 4. For example, compare Laurence Tribe’s critique of probabilistic methods in law with Daniel 
Shaviro’s defense of probabilistic proof. See Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and 
Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971); Daniel Shaviro, Statistical-Probability 
Evidence and the Appearance of Justice, 103 HARV. L. REV. 530 (1989). 
 5. For a review of the arguments both for and against probabilistic methods in law, see 
RICHARD LEMPERT & JOSEPH SANDERS, AN INVITATION TO LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE: DESERT, 
DISPUTES, AND DISTRIBUTION (1986). 
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analyze the problem of probabilistic proof through the lens of a thought-
experiment, the “Blue Bus Problem,” a famous hypothetical or “proof 
paradox” illustrating the problem of probabilistic proof. Although the blue 
bus problem is admittedly “an overly simplistic and unusual hypothetical 
case,”6 this simple thought-experiment poses fundamental questions about 
probabilistic proof and the legal process generally. Legal scholars—as 
well as mathematicians, philosophers, and psychologists—have been 
debating and discussing the blue bus case and variants of this problem for 
decades.7 In summary, solving the blue bus problem is a necessary first 
step to solving the problem of probabilistic proof.8 
 
 
 6. Gary L. Wells, Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability: Is Subjective Probability Enough?, 62 
J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL., no. 5, 1992, at 740. 
 7. For a small sample of this literature (listed chronologically), with specific reference to the 
blue bus problem, see Edward K. Cheng, Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof, 122 YALE L.J. 1254, 
1259, 1269-72 (2013); David Enoch, Levi Spectre, & Talia Fisher, Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, 
and the Legal Value of Knowledge, 40 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 197 (2012); S. M. Wexler, Two Forms of 
Legal Proof and the So-called Blue Bus Problem, 6 INT’L ZEITSCHRIFT (IZ) 1 (2010); Gary Wells, 
supra note 6, at 740; Craig R. Callen, Adjudication and the Appearance of Statistical Evidence, 65 
TUL. L. REV. 457, 494 (1991); Daniel Shaviro, supra note 4, at 530–31; Ronald J. Allen, A 
Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L. REV. 401, 430 (1986); Lea Brilmayer, Second-Order 
Evidence and Bayesian Logic, 66 B.U. L. REV. 673, 674–76 (1986); Stephen Fienberg, Gatecrashers, 
Blue Buses, and the Bayesian Representation of Legal Evidence, 66 B.U. L. REV. 693 (1986); Stephen 
Fienberg & Mark Schervish, The Relevance of Bayesian Inference for the Presentation of Statistical 
Evidence and for Legal Decisionmaking, 66 B.U. L. REV. 771, 783–84 (1986); Anne W. Martin, 
Comment, 66 B.U. L. REV. 709, 711 (1986); Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial 
Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1378 (1985); James Brook, The Use 
of Statistical Evidence of Identification in Civil Litigation: Well-Worn Hypotheticals, Real Cases, and 
Controversy,” 29 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 293, 301–03 (1985); Craig R. Callen, Notes on a Grand Illusion: 
Some Limits on the Use of Bayesian Theory in Evidence Law, 57 IND. L.J. 1097 (1982); Michael J. 
Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 123 (1980); David H. Kaye, The Paradox of the Gatecrasher and Other Stories, 
1978 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 101, 107–09 (1978). As noted in the text, the source of this famous hypothetical is 
Tribe, supra note 4, at 1340–41. 
 8. As an aside, another well-known variant of the blue bus problem is “the paradox of the 
gatecrasher.” See, e.g., Cheng, supra note 7, at 1270–71; Brilmayer, supra note 7, at 674–81, 675–78; 
Feinberg, supra note 7, at 693–97; Fienberg & Schervish, supra note 7, at 783–84; Martin, supra note 
7, at 710–11; Nesson, infra note 25, at 522 n.3; Brook, supra note 7, at 301–03. See also Richard 
Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the Process of Proof, 66 B.U. L. REV. 439, 460–
62 (1986). The source of the gatecrasher paradox is L. Jonathan Cohen. L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE 
PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE § 24, at 74-81 (1977). Yet another (more complex) variant of the blue 
bus case is the green cab, blue cab problem. See, e.g., Cheng, supra note 7, at 1273–74; Michael S. 
Pardo, The Nature and Purpose of Evidence Theory, 66 VAND. L. REV. 547, 588–89 (2013). Judith 
Jarvis Thomson, Liability and the Individualized Evidence, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 199–
200 & 203–06 (1986); Maya Bar-Hillel, The Base-Rate Fallacy in Probability Judgments, 44 ACTA 
PSYCHOLOGICA 211, 211–12 (1980); Saks & Kidd, supra note 7, at 128, 130. The original sources of 
the green cab, blue cab problem are the researchers Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. See Amos 
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Evidential Impact of Base Rates, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: 
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 153, 156-57 (Kahneman, et al. eds., , 1982). Also see problems 9 & 10 in 
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Causal Schemas in Judgments Under Uncertainty, in 1 
PROGRESS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 49, 56, 61 (Martin Fishbein ed., 1980).  
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My main goal in this paper is to visualize the blue bus problem using 
Bayesian methods of probabilistic reasoning. Although some scholars 
have applied Bayesian methods to the blue bus case, none have taken a 
visual approach to the problem.9 Ironically, trial attorneys routinely rely on 
visual forms of evidence (e.g., pictures, objects, scale models, etc.) when 
presenting their cases to juries.10 Here, I follow the lead of trial lawyers 
and present a Bayesian approach to the blue bus problem in visual form 
using numerical frequencies instead of fractions or percentages.11 In 
addition to solving the blue bus problem, my larger aim is to reevaluate 
the problem of probabilistic proof and make the case for Bayesian 
methods in civil adjudication generally.12 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Part II reviews the legal 
case that inspired the blue bus problem, Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., and 
introduces the famous blue bus thought-experiment. Part III presents a 
Bayesian method for solving the blue bus problem and presents my 
solution both in the standard Bayesian format (in terms of probabilities or 
percentages) and in visual form (in terms of natural frequencies or 
absolute numbers). In brief, the visual representation of the blue bus 
hypothetical simplifies the problem, making my Bayesian approach easier 
for judges, jurors, and lawyers to comprehend. Part IV explains why the 
Bayesian approach to probabilistic proof is a useful method for evaluating 
all forms of evidence generally. Part V concludes my exposition of a 
Bayesian visual approach to probabilistic proof.  
 
 
For an overview of these proof paradoxes and others, see Mike Redmayne, Exploring the Proof 
Paradoxes, 14 LEGAL THEORY 281 (2008). In this paper, we shall focus solely on the blue bus 
problem because of its simplicity and pedigree, or in the words of one scholar, “Although the blue bus 
case is an overly simplistic and unusual hypothetical case, . . . it drives to the heart of the questions of 
proof, sufficiency, and process.” See Wells, supra note 6, at 740. 
 9. Some scholars, however, are beginning to work on graphic and visual representations of 
evidence generally. For a summary of this work, see Peter Tiller, Introduction: Visualizing Evidence 
and Inference in Legal Settings, 6 LAW, PROB. & RISK 1 (2007). 
 10. We thank Orlando I. Martinez-Garcia, personal communication (2001), for bringing this 
point to our attention. For a diverse sample of visualization techniques in the natural sciences, see2012 
Visualization Challenge, 339 SCIENCE 509 (Judith Gan & Colin Norman eds., 2013). For the use of 
visualization techniques in a legal context, see Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction, 62 
EMORY L.J. 909 (2013). See also Orlando I Martínez-García, The Person in Law, the Number in Math: 
Improved Analysis of the Subject as Foundation for a Noveau Régime, 18 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 503 (2010). 
 11. See generally Gerd Gigerenzer & Ulrich Hoffrage, How to Improve Bayesian Reasoning 
Without Instruction: Frequency Formats, 102 PSYCHOL. REV., no. 4, 1995, at 684; see also Ulrich 
Hoffrage & Gerd Gigerenzer, Using Natural Frequencies to Improve Diagnostic Inferences, 73 ACAD. 
MED., no. 3, 1998, at 538. 
 12. We shall consider the use of probabilistic proof in criminal cases in a future paper. 
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II. BRIEF BACKGROUND 
Here, I provide some background into the blue bus hypothetical and the 
problem of probabilistic proof generally. First, I begin by examining the 
Federal Rules of Evidence. Next, I review  Smith v. Rapid Transit, the case 
that inspired the blue bus hypothetical, and provide some background on 
the nature of probabilistic proof versus traditional forms of proof. I then 
turn to the scholarly literature to introduce the blue bus thought-
experiment. 
A. The Federal Rules of Evidence 
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not address the problem of 
probabilistic proof directly. One rule broadly states that “[r]elevant 
evidence is admissible . . .” and that “[i]rrelevant evidence is not 
admissible.”13 Another rule defines “relevant evidence” as evidence 
having “any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would 
be without the evidence . . . .”14 A literal and liberal reading of these rules 
appears to make room for the use of probabilistic proof at trial, yet in the 
absence of any particularized or individualized evidence, most courts 
reject purely probabilistic proof standing alone.15 Consider the case of 
Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc. below. 
B. The Original Blue Bus Case (Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc.) 
Since Smith v. Rapid Transit provides a simple illustration of the 
problem of probabilistic proof and is also the source of the famous blue 
bus problem (see II.C below), I will first explore Smith.16 The plaintiff in 
this case, Betty Smith, alleged the following facts, as reported in Smith, 
pp. 754–755: 
In summary, the plaintiff Betty Smith was driving down Main Street in 
the City of Winthrop, Massachusetts at about 1:00 a.m. on February 6, 
1941.17 She saw a bus coming toward her at high speed and, to avoid a 
 
 
 13. Fed. R. Evid. 402. 
 14. Fed. R. Evid. 401. 
 15. See cases cited supra note 2. Notice that this judicial or common law policy systematically 
benefits defendants as a class when plaintiffs lack individualized evidence, and in the words of one 
scholar, “there is no reason why that policy should redound solely to the detriment of plaintiffs.” 
Allen, supra note 7, at 430. 
 16. In a future paper, we shall consider another leading case involving the use of probabilistic 
reasoning, People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33 (1968).  
 17. As an aside, notice that the accident occurred in February 1941, while the plaintiff’s case was 
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direct collision with the bus, she swerved to the right and crashed into a 
parked car, but she did not actually see whose bus ran her off the road. 
Nevertheless, the plaintiff later discovered that the defendant operated a 
bus line in the City of Winthrop and had an exclusive license to operate a 
bus route on Main Street, and according to the defendant’s timetable, the 
defendant’s buses were scheduled to travel down Main Street at 12:10 
a.m., 12:45 a.m., 1:15 a.m., and 2:15 a.m. Lastly, the plaintiff also 
discovered that a second bus company had a license to operate a bus line 
in the City of Winthrop but not on Main Street. 
Since this is a civil case, the plaintiff must prove her case by “a 
preponderance of the evidence.”18 Stated in probabilistic terms, it must be 
more likely than not that the defendant’s bus caused the plaintiff to swerve 
into the parked car. The problem in the Smith case, however, is that the 
only evidence linking the defendant’s bus line to the scene of the accident 
is probabilistic in nature. That is, since by the plaintiff’s own admission 
she did not actually see which bus was going down Main Street at the time 
of the accident, the only evidence linking the defendant’s bus to the scene 
of the accident is the defendant’s published timetable or schedule.  
This problem in turn presents a controversial legal issue. Stated simply, 
the issue in Smith is whether this probabilistic proof alone is enough for 
the plaintiff to prove her case. Should the plaintiff even be allowed to 
present her case to the jury? The trial judge ruled that probabilistic proof is 
not enough as a matter of law and entered a directed verdict in favor of the 
defendant bus line. The Massachusetts Supreme Court then affirmed the 
trial court’s decision, holding that probabilistic proof, by itself, is not 
sufficient to prove one’s case. The Massachusetts Supreme Court 
explained its reasoning that “[t]he most that can be said of the evidence in 
the instant case is that perhaps the mathematical chances somewhat favor 
the proposition that a bus of the defendant caused the accident. This [is] 
not enough.”19 
Why is probabilistic proof not enough? If, by the Smith Court’s own 
admission, “the mathematical chances somewhat favor the proposition that 
a bus of the defendant caused the accident,” then why is the plaintiff’s 
 
 
not finally decided until January 4, 1945. In our view, this lengthy legal delay (lasting nearly four 
years) alone justifies the consideration of alternatives to traditional litigation. See, e.g., Enrique 
Guerra-Pujol, The Turing Test and the Legal Process, 21 INFO. & COMMC’N. TECH. L. 113 (2012). 
 18. See, e.g., Wexler, supra note 7, at 16. As an aside, a fertile area for further research is the 
“proof beyond a reasonable doubt” standard in criminal law and the role of Bayesian methods in 
criminal cases. In a future paper, we shall consider the role of Bayesian reasoning in criminal cases, 
such as the controversial case of People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33 (1968). 
 19. Smith, 58 N.E.2d at 755. 
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probabilistic proof not enough to pass the lightweight “preponderance of 
the evidence” test? The “preponderance of the evidence” standard simply 
means that the plaintiff’s version of events is more likely to be true than 
the defendant’s version of events. Given that that the defendant bus line in 
Smith was the sole bus company authorized to operate on Main Street, 
then it is highly probable that the defendant’s bus was, in reality, the one 
that caused the plaintiff to swerve and crash. 
The Smith Court’s triumphant but tautological answer to this question 
was as follows: “While the defendant had the sole franchise for operating 
a bus line on Main Street, Winthrop, this did not preclude private or 
chartered buses from using this street; the bus in question could very well 
have been one operated by someone other than the defendant.”20 
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that this legal ruling, holding that 
probabilistic proof alone is “not enough,” can be restated in Bayesian 
terms as follows: evidence based on a person’s subjective or Bayesian 
priors alone are never sufficient to pass the “preponderance of the 
evidence” test. Broadly speaking, note that a “Bayesian prior” refers to 
one’s personal beliefs about the probability of a certain event before one 
has received or considered any evidence about the likelihood of that event. 
For example, in Mrs. Smith’s case, one might assign an equal probability 
that the defendant’s bus or another bus caused her accident before taking 
notice of the defendant’s timetable or the fact that no other bus company 
had the legal right to travel on Main Street.21  
The Smith Court’s conclusion, however, is circular. Even if the plaintiff 
herself or another eyewitness were able to identify the particular bus that 
was going down Main Street at the time of the accident, it is still possible, 
as the Smith Court stated, that “the bus in question could very well have 
been one operated by someone other than the defendant.”22 After all, the 
plaintiff’s identification testimony would no doubt be self-serving and 
biased. Further, her vision could have been cloudy, her recollection 
imperfect.23 In sum, even if the plaintiff or a neutral witness had seen the 
actual bus that caused Mrs. Smith to swerve, the evidence would still 
remain probabilistic in nature, because even if the plaintiff were to offer 
 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. For a readable overview of the Bayesian approach to probability, see NATE SILVER, THE 
SIGNAL AND THE NOISE: WHY MOST PREDICTIONS FAIL BUT SOME DON’T 232-261 (2012). 
 22. Smith, 58 N.E.2d at 755. 
 23. For a comprehensive overview of cognitive biases in the adjudication process, See generally, 
Saks & Kidd, supra note 7. Since the unreliability of eyewitness testimony is by now well-known, this 
is why we insist that all forms of evidence, even individualized or particularized evidence, are 
probabilistic in nature. 
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individualized or particularized proof (as opposed to mere probabilistic 
proof), it would still be possible that the witness could be mistaken, that 
“the bus in question could very well have been one operated by someone 
other than the defendant”!24 
Nevertheless, despite its circular reasoning, the Smith case poses an 
important question about the role of probabilistic proof in law. 
C. The Blue Bus Thought-Experiment 
We now turn our attention to the blue bus problem, a famous thought-
experiment in evidence law.25 Broadly speaking, thought-experiments like 
the blue bus problem are useful because they reveal anomalies, help clarify 
our thinking, and lead to new insights. Professor Laurence Tribe, the 
original source of this thought-experiment, presents the problem as 
follows: 
Consider next [a case] in which the identity of the responsible agent 
is in doubt. Plaintiff is negligently run down by a blue bus. The 
question is whether the bus belonged to the defendant. Plaintiff is 
prepared to prove that defendant operates four-fifths of all the blue 
buses in town. What effect, if any, should such proof be given?”26 
Professor Tribe’s hypothetical has generated extensive commentary 
among scholars (see references in footnote 8 above) and has been retold 
many times over the years. For example, Professor Charles Nesson 
 
 
 24. For a detailed and well-reasoned critique of the standard arguments against the use of 
probabilistic evidence, see Brilmayer, supra note 7, at 674–81. For brevity, we shall not cover this 
highly technical terrain in this paper, for our main point is that all evidence is ultimately probabilistic. 
 25. The blue bus hypothetical has many names. Ed Cheng, for example, refers to “the Blue Bus 
problem famous in statistical proof circles.” Cheng, supra note 7, at 1259. Similarly, Steve Wexler, 
Lea Brilmayer, and Anne Martin also refer to “the blue bus problem.” Wexler, supra note 7, at 2; 
Brilmayer, supra note 7, at 674; and Martin, supra note 7, at 711. For their part, Gary Wells and 
Charles Nesson refer to “the blue bus case,” while Craig Callen refers to “the popular hypothetical 
from the Smith case.” Wells, supra note 6, at 740; Nesson, supra note 7, at 1378; Callen, supra note 7, 
at 494. In a different paper, Professor Nesson refers to “the famous blue bus hypothetical.” See Charles 
Nesson, Agent Orange Meets the Blue Bus: Factfinding at the Frontier of Knowledge, 66 B.U. L. REV. 
521, 522 (1986). Stephen Feinberg refers to “Laurence Tribe’s ‘case of the blue bus’” as a “classic 
hypothetical[ ].” Feinberg, supra note 7, at 693. Likewise, Craig Callen refers to “Professor Tribe’s 
blue bus hypothetical . . . .” Callen, Notes on a Grand Illusion, supra note 7, at 34. 
 26. Tribe, supra note 4, at 1340–41. Although the primary source for the blue bus hypothetical is 
Tribe’s 1971 paper, in a footnote Tribe acknowledges that Smith v. Rapid Transit is “the actual case on 
which this famous chestnut is based.” Id. at 1341 n.37 Tribe’s reference to “this famous chestnut” 
appears to imply that the blue bus hypothetical was already part of a well-established oral tradition 
among generations of law professors and law students. For another famous example of “a fairly well-
defined oral tradition,” this one in economics, see R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & 
ECON. 1, 39–42 (1960) (analysis of factory smoke). 
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describes the blue bus problem as follows: 
While driving late at night on a dark, two-lane road, a person 
confronts an oncoming bus speeding down the center line of the 
road in the opposite direction. In the glare of the headlights, the 
person sees that the vehicle is a bus, but he cannot otherwise 
identify it. He swerves to avoid a collision, and his car hits a tree. 
The bus speeds past without stopping. The injured person later sues 
the Blue Bus Company. He proves, in addition to the facts stated 
above, that the Blue Bus Company owns and operates 80% of the 
buses that run on the road where the accident occurred. Can he 
win?27 
For her part, Professor Lea Brilmayer presents the blue bus problem as 
follows: 
In the blue bus problem, the plaintiff has uncontroverted  
eyewitness testimony demonstrating that he was run over by a blue 
bus. However, he does not have a license plate number or any other 
evidence tending to show which blue bus it was. The defendant in 
the hypothetical owns four-fifths of the blue buses in town.28 
Similarly, Professor Daniel Shaviro restates the problem as follows: 
Consider the well-known hypothetical case in which a plaintiff is hit 
by a bus that she knows is blue but cannot otherwise describe. She 
establishes that the defendant bus company operates eighty percent 
of all the blue buses in the area. In the absence of other relevant 
evidence, this evidence establishes an eighty percent chance that the 
bus company is liable. Nonetheless, the plaintiff is denied recovery 
by directed verdict.29 
Most recently, Professor Edward Cheng presents the problem as 
follows: 
Recall the facts of Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., as famously adapted 
by Laurence Tribe and Charles Nesson. The plaintiff is driving 
along a two-lane undivided country road on a dark night when she 
 
 
 27. Nesson, supra note 7, at 1378–79. 
 28. Brilmayer, supra note 7, at 674. 
 29. Shaviro, supra note 4, at 530–31 (citations omitted). Shaviro’s statement of the blue bus 
problem also appears in Ronald J. Allen, On the Significance of Batting Averages and Strikeout Totals: 
A Clarification of the Naked Statistical Evidence Debate, the Meaning of Evidence, and the 
Requirement of Proof beyond a Reasonable Doubt, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1093, 1097–98 (1991). 
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is faced with the oncoming lights of a bus traveling along the 
median. To avoid an accident, the plaintiff swerves, causing her car 
to end up in a roadside ditch. Because of the emergency, the 
plaintiff is unable to observe anything except that the bus was blue. 
The plaintiff presents this testimony, along with evidence that the 
defendant, the Blue Bus Company, operates 80 percent of the blue 
buses in town. The defense concedes both facts and presents no 
additional evidence. Is the plaintiff entitled to recover?30 
In sum, as this small sample shows, the blue bus problem has been stated 
and restated in different ways over the years. Nevertheless, all these 
versions of the blue bus problem share the same information content. 
Specifically, these various versions of the blue bus problem provide us 
with two pieces of information:  
1. The plaintiff was injured by a blue bus. 
2. The defendant operates four-fifths or 80% of all the blue buses 
in town. 
Thus, since all of these statements of the blue bus problem share the same 
information content, we shall refer to them as the “standard version” of the 
blue bus problem 
Given this information content, the standard version of the blue bus 
problem is a useful thought-experiment. In the words of the historian of 
science Thomas Kuhn, for example, a thought-experiment, or the close 
analysis of an “imagined situation,” can confront its audience with 
unanticipated consequences of their normal conceptual operations.31 This 
is precisely why the blue bus hypothetical is useful and illuminating, for it 
produces a clear anomaly or contradiction. Specifically, when confronted 
with the blue bus problem, most people are reluctant to impose civil 
liability on the defendant in this case, even though there is a substantial 
statistical probability that it was the defendant’s blue bus that caused the 
plaintiff’s injuries.32 Thus, the blue bus problem presents a puzzle: given 
such a high level of probability of guilt, why does plaintiff’s case in this 
hypothetical not pass the “preponderance of the evidence” test? 
 
 
 30. Cheng, supra note 7, at 1269 (citations omitted). 
 31. THOMAS S. KUHN, A Function for Thought Experiments, in THE ESSENTIAL TENSION: 
SELECTED STUDIES IN SCIENTIFIC TRADITION AND CHANGE 240, 252 (1977). By way of example, in 
his essay on thought experiments Kuhn explains how Galileo’s simple thought experiment on falling 
objects transformed the classical or Aristotelian conception of speed. Id. at 249. 
 32. This is not mere idle speculation or armchair theorizing. See Wells, supra note 6, for 
experimental confirmation of this result. 
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One possible reason for this anomaly, however, is simply the low 
information content of the blue bus problem. That is, in Bayesian terms, 
the standard version of the blue bus problem provides information only 
about true positives or “hits”: the fraction of buses that are blue. It does 
not, however, provide any information about false positives or “false 
alarms”—the number of buses that are blue but that are not owned by the 
defendant—nor are we given any information about the total number of 
buses in town (not just blue buses, but all buses). Given this information 
gap, it is no wonder why so many legal scholars33 have rejected the use of 
probabilistic proof. The standard version of the blue bus problem does not 
provide us with sufficient information to draw a Bayesian inference about 
the strength of the evidence in the blue bus case. We are not the first to 
make this observation,34 but in part three of the paper below, we are the 
first to consider different versions of the blue bus problem and to present 
our Bayesian model of the blue bus problem in visual form. 
Putting the issue of information content to one side, the standard 
version of the blue bus problem also presents a larger question about the 
role of probabilistic proof or “naked statistical evidence” in law. Legal 
scholars are sharply divided on this question, offering a wide variety of 
reasons in support or against the use of probabilistic proof. In summary, 
the arguments against probabilistic proof often focus on moral intuitions, 
on the qualitative or non-quantitative aspects of evidence, and on the 
public perception of the legal system, or in the words of one academic, the 
“danger in being mesmerized by precision and formalization.”35 
Yet the critics of probabilistic proof all miss an important point: all 
evidence is ultimately probabilistic in nature. Harvard Law Professor 
Charles Nesson, for example, has argued that jury verdicts based solely on 
probabilistic evidence would undermine the public legitimacy of the legal 
system.36 In the words of Professor Nesson, “What is crucial in this 
situation is that the public cannot view whatever statement the factfinder 
makes as anything other than a bet based on the evidence.”37 This 
reasoning is just as unpersuasive, and equally as circular, as the court’s 
reasoning in the Smith case. After all, if all evidence (statistical or not) is 
 
 
 33.  See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 4; Nesson, supra note 25. 
 34. See, e.g., Wells, supra note 6, at 752 (“there is no other evidence [in the blue bus case] to 
combine with the base rates.”); Fienberg & Schervish, supra note 7, at 783 (“the only evidence [in the 
blue bus case] is a summary statistic”); Martin, supra note 7, at 712 (the blue bus problem “do[es] not 
provide sufficient information to apply Bayes’s Theorem”). 
 35. Brilmayer, supra note 7, at 691. 
 36. See Nesson, supra note 7, at 1378–79. 
 37. Id. at 1379. 
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probabilistic in nature, then all jury verdicts are “anything other than a bet 
on the evidence.” Professor Tribe too concurs with the outcome in Smith: 
“cases like Smith are entirely sensible if understood instead as insisting on 
the presentation of some non-statistical and ‘individualized’ proof of 
identity before compelling a party to pay damages . . . .”38 Nevertheless, 
this argument is weak and unpersuasive for the same reason that Nesson’s 
argument fails. In sum, the problem with Tribe’s reasoning is that all 
forms of evidence, even non-statistical evidence and “individualized” 
proof, are ultimately probabilistic in nature. 
In contrast, the arguments in favor of probabilistic evidence generally 
emphasize the goal of accuracy in adjudication and question the 
distinction between individualized or particularized evidence and 
“probabilistic evidence” or “naked statistical evidence.” The proponents of 
probabilistic proof, however, have generally been unable to solve the blue 
bus problem. Furthermore, their arguments are generally complex, hard to 
follow, and impractical in a traditional math-phobic legal setting. For 
example, Stephen Fienberg and Mark Schervish, two leading proponents 
of Bayesian reasoning in law, have themselves conceded that 
“implementation of [Bayesian methods], especially in the legal setting, is 
fraught with difficulties.”39 
In the remainder of this Article, I shall take a different approach to the 
blue bus problem. Specifically, we shall visualize the blue bus problem 
from a Bayesian perspective. In sum, a Bayesian approach to the blue bus 
case allows one to avoid circular reasoning, solves the problem of 
probabilistic proof by identifying the missing information one needs in 
order to make Bayesian inferences, and most importantly, provides an 
accurate alternative to traditional adjudication. In addition, the visual 
representation of the blue bus hypothetical simplifies the blue bus 
problem, making our Bayesian reasoning easy to perform and making our 
Bayesian solutions easy to understand. 
III. A VISUAL APPROACH TO THE BLUE BUS PROBLEM 
Here, we present a Bayesian model of Professor Tribe’s famous blue 
bus hypothetical. In addition, we present our model in two formats: (i) in 
the standard Bayesian format (in terms of probabilities or percentages) as 
well as (ii) in visual form (in terms of natural frequencies or absolute 
numbers). Before presenting our model, however, we must mention that 
 
 
 38. Tribe, supra note 4, at 1341 n.37. 
 39. Fienberg & Schervish, supra note 7, at 794. 
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the blue bus problem (as stated by Tribe and others) does not have a single 
solution. That is, to apply Bayesian reasoning to the blue bus problem or 
any other probabilistic proof problem, we need three pieces of 
information: (i) the percentage of city buses that run on Main Street (the 
base rate), (ii) the percentage of buses that run on Main Street that are blue 
(hits), and (iii) the percentage of blue buses that do not run on Main Street 
(false alarms or misses).40 Since the standard version of the blue bus 
problem (as summarized in Part II.C. above) does not provide us with 
information about items (i) and (iii), we shall consider different versions 
of the blue bus problem in Parts 3.A to 3.G below; we solve a variety of 
blue bus problems with different values for items (i), (ii) and (iii). 
A. Example #1 (Standard Probability Format) 
As we noted above, we need three pieces of information to apply 
Bayesian methods to the blue bus problem: 
(i) the total number of buses in the population of city buses, or base 
rate information; 
(ii) the number of “hits” or the conditional probability that a bus is 
blue, given that it runs on Main Street, expressed as “p(blue|Main)” 
in standard Bayesian notation; and, 
(iii) the number of “false alarms” or the conditional probability that 
a bus is blue, but does not run on Main Street, expressed as 
“p(blue|not Main)” or p(blue|~Main)” in standard Bayesian 
notation. 
Since the standard version of the blue bus problem (as summarized in Part 
III.A above) provides information about item (ii) but is silent about items 
(i) and (iii), for our first version of the blue bus problem we shall assume 
the following priors: 
• 40% of all buses run through Main Street, 60% do not; 
• 80% of the buses running down Main Street are blue;41 and, 
• 10% of the buses that do not run on Main Street are blue. 
 
 
 40. Christoph Engel & Gerd Gigerenzer, Law and Heuristics: An Interdisciplinary Venture, in 
HEURISTICS AND THE LAW 1, 10 (Christoph Engel & Gerd Gigerenzer eds., 2006) (using the terms 
“false alarms” and “misses”). See also Enrique Guerra-Pujol, supra note 17, at 115. 
 41. This assumption is based on the standard version of the blue bus problem as summarized in 
Part II.C above. See also Tribe, supra note 4, at 1340–41. 
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Given these pieces of information, what is the posterior probability that 
a bus runs on Main Street, given that it is blue? 
Before proceeding, notice that this question is precisely what our 
Bayesian model of the blue bus problem is designed to test. That is, our 
Bayesian model of the blue bus problem is designed to test or measure the 
strength of the plaintiff’s hypothesis that it was a blue bus that caused her 
to swerve. Notice, too, that this question states the blue bus problem in a 
different way. We are not asking, “What is the probability that the bus in 
the plaintiff’s case was blue?” Instead, we are asking a different question, 
“What is the probability that a bus will be on Main Street, given that it is a 
blue bus?” 
Now, to perform this critical test, we begin by asking, what do we 
know? What pieces of information do we have? 
First, we already know that 40% of all city buses run through Main 
Street. This is our “prior probability” and can be stated formally as 
follows: 
p(Main) = 0.4 
Next, we also know that 80% of the buses that run on Main Street are 
blue. This is our “first conditional probability” and can be stated formally 
as follows: 
p(blue|Main) = 0.8 
In plain language, the probability that a certain bus is blue, given that it 
runs on Main Street, is 80% or 0.8. Also, notice that this assumption is 
based on Tribe’s famous blue bus problem.42 
Lastly, we know that 10% of the buses that do not run on Main Street 
are blue. This is our “second conditional probability” and can also be 
stated formally as follows: 
p(blue|~Main) = 0.1 
In plain language, the probability that a certain bus is blue, given that it 
does not run on Main Street, is 10% or 0.1. 
Given these pieces of information, we want to test the plaintiff’s blue 
bus hypothesis by solving for: 
p(Main|blue) = ? 
Or, stated formally, given our priors p(Main), p(blue|Main), and 
p(blue|~Main), what is the revised or posterior probability that a certain 
bus runs on Main Street, given that it is blue? In plain language, what is 
 
 
42.   See id. 
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the strength of the plaintiff’s hypothesis that a blue bus caused her to 
swerve? 
In brief, we can test plaintiff’s blue bus hypothesis using Bayesian 
reasoning as follows: 
1. First, since 40% of city buses run on Main Street, and since 80% 
of those buses that travel down Main Street are blue, then 32% 
of all city buses are blue and run through Main Street [0.4 * 0.8 
= 0.32]; 
2. Next, since 60% of the buses do not run down Main Street, and 
since only10% of those buses are blue, then 6% of all city buses 
are blue and do not run through Main Street [0.6 * 0.1 = 0.06]; 
3. Therefore, since 32% + 6% = 38%, then a total of 38% of the 
buses that run down Main Street are blue; 
4. Lastly, since 0.32 divided by 0.38 = 0.842, this means that there 
is an 84.2% posterior probability that a certain bus runs on Main 
Street, given that it is blue. 
In other words, it is very likely that the bus on Main Street that caused the 
plaintiff to swerve was a blue bus. Specifically, our conditional 
probabilities in this example caused us to revise or update our prior 
probability from 40% to over 84%. Our Bayesian approach has tested the 
plaintiff’s hypothesis, and the plaintiff has passed this test with flying 
colors. 
But why should this Bayesian probability be relevant at trial? That is, 
after all, the larger question posed by cases like Smith v. Rapid Transit and 
by the blue bus problem in particular. 
Recall that the injured plaintiff in the blue bus problem knows where 
the accident occurred (on Main Street) but does not know the color of the 
bus that caused her to swerve. But the fact that the plaintiff knows where 
the accident occurs tells us something about the probable color of the bus 
that caused her to swerve! In brief, this is why Bayesian reasoning is so 
helpful in solving the blue bus problem. 
Example #1 (Visual Format) 
Now, we present the above example visually in a “frequency tree” 
format43 as follows: 
 
 
 43.  Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, How to Improve Bayesian Reasoning, supra note 11. 
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With this visual format as our guide, we now present our first version of 
the blue bus problem (Example #1) using absolute numbers in place of 
abstract percentages as follows: 
 
In summary, this frequency tree consists of three rows of information. 
The top row of the tree tells us the total number of buses in the population 
of city buses. [For simplicity, we assume there are 100 buses. This way, 
the absolute numbers in our frequency tree will correspond one-to-one 
with the probabilities/percentages in the standard probability format 
above.] The middle row provides the relevant base rate information in 
absolute numbers, telling us (in this example) that 40 of the 100 buses in 
town run on Main Street and that the remaining 60 buses do not run 
through Main Street. In Bayesian terms, the absolute number 40 is 
equivalent to p(Main) above, or the prior probability that a bus runs on 
Main Street. 
Lastly, the bottom row of the tree contains the relevant conditional 
probabilities, that is, the critical information regarding “hits,” “misses,” 
and “false alarms” that will allow us to perform a Bayesian test to measure 
the strength of plaintiff’s evidence. Before proceeding, notice that the 
most important pieces of information appear in the first and third branches 
of the tree, moving from left to right.  
Specifically, the first branch on the bottom of the tree (on the left) tells 
us the number of “hits” in our example, that is, the absolute number of 
blue buses that run on Main Street. In Bayesian terms, the first branch is 
equivalent to p(blue|Main), or the conditional probability that a bus is blue 
given that it runs down Main Street. In this example, 32 of the 40 buses 
that run on Main Street are blue buses. 
By contrast, the third branch on the bottom of the tree (going from left 
100	  
40	  
32	   8	  
60	  
6	   54	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to right) tells us the absolute number of “false alarms,” the number of blue 
buses that do not run on Main Street. In this particular example, there are 
six false alarms since 6 out of the 60 buses that do not run on Main Street 
are blue. (In Bayesian terms, this branch is equivalent to p(blue|not Main), 
the conditional probability that a bus is blue given that it does not run on 
Main Street.) 
One of the advantages of visualizing the blue bus problem using a 
frequency tree is that this method makes it easier to apply Bayesian 
reasoning to the problem. We only need two pieces of information—the 
number of hits and the number of false alarms—in order to find the 
Bayesian posterior (i.e., in order to determine the posterior probability that 
a bus is on Main Street given that it is blue). 
In this particular example, we thus have 32 hits and 6 false alarms. In 
other words, there is an absolute total of 38 blue buses in town. Of these 
38 blue buses, 32 buses run on Main Street (hits), while 6 do not (false 
alarms). Next, we find our Bayesian posterior by dividing the number of 
hits by the total number of hits and false alarms as follows:  𝑝 𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑏𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 3232 + 6 = 3248 = 0.84 
Stated formally, there is an 84% posterior probability that a bus that 
runs down Main Street is blue. In plain language, since we know the 
accident occurred on Main Street, and since the hits outnumber the misses 
by a wide margin in this version of the problem, there is an extremely high 
posterior probability that the plaintiff’s accident was caused by a blue bus. 
Thus, the plaintiff should pass the “preponderance of the evidence” test 
because it is more likely than not in this example that a blue bus caused 
the accident. 
B. Example #2 (Standard Format)  
Consider next what effect a change in the prior probability p(Main) has 
on the posterior probability p(Main|blue). In our original version of the 
blue bus problem in Part III.A above (Example #1), we assumed that 
p(Main) was equal to 40% or 0.4. What happens, however, when p(Main) 
is lowered to 0.1? That is, what if only 10% instead of 40% of all city 
buses run through Main Street? 
In summary, because our hit and miss rates remain constant,44 the 
 
 
 44. For simplicity, we continue to use the conditional probabilities p(blue|Main) and 
p(blue|~Main) constant. Thus, the hit rate p(blue|Main) remains 0.8, and the miss rate p(blue|~Main) 
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evidence in support of plaintiff’s hypothesis has not changed, and thus the 
degree or level of Bayesian updating in this example does not change. But 
because the prior probability is now much lower (10% instead of 40%), 
we would expect the posterior probability to also be lower, but the 
question is, how much lower?  
To find out, we apply Bayesian reasoning to find the new posterior 
probability as follows: 
1. Since 10% of city buses run on Main Street, and since 80% of 
those buses that travel down Main Street are blue, then only 8% 
of all city buses are blue and run through Main Street [0.1 * 0.8 
= 0.08]; 
2. Since 90% of all city buses do not run down Main Street, and 
since only 10% of those buses are blue, then 9% of all city buses 
do not run through Main Street and are blue [0.9 * 0.1 = 0.09]; 
3. Lastly, since 0.06 + 0.09 = 0.17, a total of 17% of city buses are 
blue, and since 0.08 divided by 0.17 = 0.47, this means that there 
is only a 47% posterior probability that a certain bus runs on 
Main Street, given that it is blue. 
Notice that the prior probability p(Main) has a substantial effect on the 
posterior probability p(Main|blue). Specifically, since so few buses run 
through Main Street (the scene of the accident), there is low probability 
that a blue bus caused the plaintiff’s accident in this version of the blue 
bus problem, even when 80% of the buses that run on Main Street are 
blue. This finding, in turn, helps explain why the standard version of the 
blue bus problem (as summarized in Part II.C above) does not pass the 
“preponderance of the evidence” test: since the standard version of the 
blue bus case, such as Professor Tribe’s blue bus hypothetical, provides no 
information about p(Main), the posterior probability p(Main|blue) can 
either be low (as in this example) or high (as in the next example).  
 
 
also remains 0.1, as in Example #1. We hold these conditional probabilities constant in order to test 
what effect a change in the prior probability has on the posterior probability. 
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Example #2 (visual format) 
We now present our second version of the blue bus problem visually 
using absolute numbers as follows: 
 
 
Again, we use absolute numbers instead of percentages or probabilities, 
starting with a population of 100 city buses.  
First, recall our presentation of this particular example in the standard 
probability format. Although we ended up revising our prior probability 
upward from 0.1 to 0.47, we concluded that a Bayesian posterior of 0.47 
does not pass the “preponderance of the evidence” test. Now, consider the 
absolute number of “hits” and “false alarms” on the bottom row of the 
frequency tree. We immediately notice that the 9 false alarms exceed the 8 
hits by a small margin. This is an important observation. Without having 
to perform any complicated computation, we can immediately conclude 
that a random blue bus is slightly less likely to run on Main Street than a 
bus of another color, even though 80% of the buses that run on Main 
Street are blue buses. 
The frequency tree above explains why. In brief, the small number of 
false alarms exceeds the number of hits because only 10 of the 100 city 
buses in this example run on Main Street, but 8 of these 10 buses are blue 
(since our hit rate in this example is 0.8, and 80% of 10 is 8), and of the 90 
buses that do not run on Main Street, only 9 are blue. Thus there are more 
false alarms than hits. 
  
100	  
10	  
8	   2	  
90	  
9	   81	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C. Example #3 (Standard Format) 
Consider what happens when we increase the prior probability p(Main) 
that the buses in our population of city buses run on Main Street. In the 
previous example, we assumed that p(Main) was equal to 0.1. What 
happens, however, when p(Main) is raised to 0.8?45 Since the prior 
probability is now much greater, we would also expect the posterior 
probability to be greater. In particular, we wish to discover how much 
greater will the posterior probability be when p(Main) is raised from 0.1 to 
0.8,? 
Again, for simplicity, we continue to hold the hit and miss rates 
constant, so the first conditional probability p(blue|Main) remains 0.8, and 
likewise, the second conditional probability p(blue|~Main) also remains 
0.1. Given this information, we apply standard Bayesian reasoning to 
calculate the posterior probability as follows: 
1. Since 80% of all city buses run on Main Street, and since 80% of 
those buses are blue, then 64% of all city buses are blue and run 
through Main Street [0.8 * 0.8 = 0.64]; 
2. Since 20% of all city buses do not run down Main Street, and 
since only 10% of those buses are blue, then 2% of all city buses 
do not run through Main Street and are blue [0.2 * 0.1 = 0.02]; 
3. Lastly, since 0.64 + 0.02 = 0.66, a total of 66% of city buses are 
blue, and since 0.64 divided by 0.66 = 0.96, this means that there 
is a whopping 96% posterior probability that a certain bus runs 
on Main Street, given that it is blue. 
In other words, the prior probability has a substantial effect on the 
posterior probability, even when the hit and miss rates remain the same. 
Specifically, since most buses run through Main Street (since the value for 
p(Main) is high in this case), and, since we know the accident occurred on 
Main Street, there is an extremely high posterior probability in this version 
of the blue bus problem that the plaintiff’s accident was caused by a blue 
bus. Thus, the plaintiff in this example should pass the “preponderance of 
the evidence” test because it is more likely than not that a blue bus caused 
the accident.  
 
 
 45. That is, suppose 80% instead of only 10% of all city buses run through Main Street. 
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Example #3 (visual format) 
We now present this version of the blue bus problem visually as 
follows, using absolute numbers instead of percentages: 
 
Without having to perform any complicated computations, we 
immediately notice 64 “hits” compared with just 2 “false alarms.” In 
Bayesian terms, a random blue bus in this example is far more likely to 
run on Main Street than a bus of any other color because the number of 
hits exceeds the number of false alarms by a wide margin. 
Again, the frequency tree explains this conclusion in three steps: most 
of the city buses run on Main Street (80 out of 100) (step one), and most of 
these buses in turn are blue (64 out of 80) (step two), while only 2 of the 
20 buses that do not run on Main Street are blue (step 3). Thus, because 
there are far more hits than false alarms, it is more likely than not (in terms 
of the preponderance of the evidence standard) that the bus that caused the 
plaintiff’s accident was a blue bus. The plaintiff in this particular example 
should thus pass the “preponderance of the evidence” test. 
D. Example #4 (Standard Format) 
Next, consider what happens when the hit rate, p(blue|Main), is greater 
than the miss rate, p(blue|~Main). Expressed in the standard Bayesian 
probability format, what happens when we return the prior probability 
back to its original value, 40%, and instead increase the first conditional 
100	  
80	  
64	   16	  
20	  
2	   18	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probability or hit rate to 95%? In this version of the blue bus problem, our 
revised priors are as follows: 
• The probability that a city bus runs on Main Street is 0.4; 
• The probability that a certain bus is blue, given that it runs on 
Main Street, is now 0.95; 
• The probability that a certain bus is blue, given that it does not 
run on Main Street, is still 0.1. 
Given this revised data, we apply Bayesian reasoning to find the new 
posterior probability as follows:  
1. Since 40% of all city buses run on Main Street, and since 95% of 
those buses are blue, then 38% of all city buses are blue and run 
through Main Street [0.4 * 0.95 = 0.38]; 
2. Since 60% of all city buses do not run down Main Street, and 
since only 10% of those buses are blue, then 6% of all city buses 
do not run through Main Street and are blue [0.6 * 0.1 = 0.06]; 
3. Since 0.38 + 0.06 = 0.44, a total of 44% of city buses are blue, 
and since 0.38 divided by 0.44 = 0.86, this means that there is a 
whopping 86% posterior probability that a certain bus runs on 
Main Street, given that it is blue. 
Notice that the first conditional probability p(blue|Main) in this 
example is far larger than the other conditional probability p(blue|~Main). 
In plain language, this means that there are significantly more buses that 
are blue and that run on Main Street than buses that are blue but do not run 
on Main Street. Based on the evidence in this example, we must update 
our posterior probability that a bus is on Main Street given that it is blue 
upwards—in this example, from 40% percent up to 86%. Although the 
plaintiff in the blue bus problem may not have seen the color of the bus 
that caused her to swerve, she knows that the accident occurred on Main 
Street, and the Bayesian updating in this example strongly supports her 
hypothesis that a blue bus caused her to swerve. 
Also, before proceeding, notice that this version of the blue bus 
problem corresponds most closely to the facts in Smith v. Rapid Transit, 
discussed in Part II.B of this article. In essence, the plaintiff’s evidence in 
Smith showed that only the equivalent of blue buses were authorized to 
run on Main Street, but as the court noted, the plaintiff’s probabilistic 
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proof “did not preclude private or chartered buses from using this street.”46 
According to the court’s reasoning, there was always a small probability 
that a non-blue bus was travelling down Main Street at the time of the 
accident. What the court should have been asking, however, was “how 
small” was this small probability? 
Example #4 (visual format) 
Using our frequency tree format, we now present this example visually 
as follows: 
 
Again, without having to perform any complicated computations, we 
immediately notice 38 “hits” compared with just 6 “false alarms.” Thus, as 
in the previous example, a random blue bus in this particular example is 
more likely to run on Main Street than a bus of any other color because the 
number of hits exceeds the number of false alarms by a wide margin. In 
legal terms, the plaintiff in this example should pass the “preponderance of 
the evidence” test. 
E. Example #5 (Standard Format) 
Now, consider what happens when both the hit rate and miss rate are 
high. For example, what happens when the hit rate p(blue|Main) is 95% 
and the miss rate p(blue|~Main) is 80%, while the base rate p(Main) is 
 
 
 46.  Smith, 58 N.E.2d at 755.  
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constant at 40%, as in our original example?47 Our revised priors are now 
as follows: 
• The probability that a city bus runs on Main Street is still 0.4; 
• The probability that a certain bus is blue, given that it runs on 
Main Street, is 0.95; 
• The probability that a certain bus is blue, given that it does not 
run on Main Street, is now 0.8. 
Given these revised pieces of information, we apply standard Bayesian 
reasoning to update our priors as follows:  
1. Since 40% of all city buses run on Main Street, and since 95% of 
those buses are blue, then 38% of all city buses are blue and run 
through Main Street [0.4 * 0.95 = 0.38]; 
2. Since 60% of all city buses do not run down Main Street, and 
since 80% of those buses are blue, then 48% of all city buses do 
not run through Main Street and are blue [0.6 * 0.8 = 0.48]; 
3. Since 0.38 + 0.48 = 0.86, a total of 86% of city buses are blue; 
4. Lastly, since 0.38 divided by 0.86 = 0.44, there is only a 44% 
posterior probability that a certain bus runs on Main Street, given 
that it is blue. 
In summary, notice that the prior probability, p(Main), in this example 
and in the previous example did not change. In both cases, p(Main) was 
set at 40%. Notice too that the posterior probability in this example, 44%, 
remained close to our prior probability, 40%. In the previous example, by 
contrast, the posterior probability increased to 86%, a large departure from 
our original prior probability. 
Thus, by comparing this example to the previous one, we see how the 
difference between the two conditional probabilities (the difference 
between the rate of hits and the rate of misses) determines the level of 
updating in our Bayesian model. In sum, if the difference between the two 
conditional probabilities is small (as in this example), then the effect on 
the prior probability is small. We do not need to update or revise our prior 
probability too greatly. If, however, the difference between the two 
conditional probabilities is large (as in the previous example), then this 
 
 
 47. We continue to hold p(Main) constant in order to test the effect of changes in the hit and miss 
rates. 
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difference will lead us to revise our prior probability by a large amount as 
well. 
Example #5 (visual format) 
We now present this same example visually as follows: 
 
Once again, without having to perform any complicated computations, 
we immediately notice the total or absolute number of hits and false 
alarms: 38 hits versus 48 false alarms. Since there are more false alarms 
than hits, this means that a random blue bus is less likely to run on Main 
Street than a bus of another color. Given this observation, the plaintiff 
should not pass the “preponderance of the evidence” test. 
F. Example #6 (Standard Format) 
Next, consider what happens when the miss rate is greater than the hit 
rate. Expressed in Bayesian terms, what happens when the second 
conditional probability is larger that the first conditional probability? For 
example, what if p(blue|Main) is only 30%, while p(blue|~Main) is 60%?48 
Our revised priors can thus be stated formally as follows: 
• The probability that a city bus runs on Main Street is 0.4; 
 
 
 48. Again, we hold p(Main) constant at 40% in order to test the effect of changes in the hit and 
miss rates. 
100	  
40	  
38	   2	  
60	  
48	   12	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• The probability that a certain bus is blue, given that it runs on 
Main Street, is 0.3; 
• The probability that a certain bus is blue, given that it does not 
run on Main Street, is 0.6. 
Stated formally, the second conditional probability (“the probability 
that a bus is blue given that it does not run on Main Street”) is twice as 
large as the first conditional probability (“the probability that a bus is blue 
given that it does run on Main Street”). Given this new data, we apply 
standard Bayesian reasoning as follows: 
• Since 40% of all city buses run on Main Street, and since 30% 
of those buses are blue, then 12% of all city buses are blue and 
run through Main Street [0.4 * 0.3 = 0.12]; 
• Since 60% of all city buses do not run down Main Street, and 
since 60% of those buses are blue, then 42% of all city buses do 
not run through Main Street and are blue [0.6 * 0.6 = 0.36]; 
• Since 0.12 + 0.36 = 0.48, a total of 48% of city buses are blue, 
and since 0.12 divided by 0.48 = 0.25, there is only a 25% 
posterior probability that a certain bus runs on Main Street, 
given that it is blue. 
In other words, when the second conditional probability is larger than 
the first conditional probability, (i.e., when the rate of misses is larger than 
the rate of hits) we must update our prior probability downward—in this 
example, from 40% down to 25%.  
Now, consider this result in light of the blue bus problem. When the 
rate of misses p(blue|~Main) is greater than the rate of hits p(blue|Main), 
this means that there are more buses that are blue and do not run on Main 
Street than buses that are blue and do run on Main Street. Since our 
hypothesis is that a blue bus caused the plaintiff’s accident, our 
conditional probabilities are telling us that this hypothesis is more likely to 
be false because it is more likely for a bus on Main Street not to be blue. 
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Example #6 (visual format) 
We now present this example visually as follows: 
 
Without having to perform any complicated computations, we 
immediately notice 12 hits and 36 false alarms. As in the previous 
example, there are more false alarms than hits. In Bayesian terms, a 
random blue bus is less likely to run on Main Street than a bus of another 
color, and given this observation, the plaintiff in this example should not 
pass the “preponderance of the evidence” test. 
G. Example #7 (Standard Format) 
Lastly, suppose the rate of hits and false alarms are the same. In 
Bayesian terms, what if our conditional probabilities are the same? For 
example, our hit rate p(blue|Main) is now 0.8 and our miss rate 
p(blue|~Main) is now 0.8, while p(Main) is constant at 0.4. Our revised 
priors are now as follows: 
• The probability that a city bus runs on Main Street is 0.4; 
• The probability that a certain bus is blue, given that it runs on 
Main Street, is 0.8; 
• The probability that a certain bus is blue, given that it does not 
run on Main Street, is 0.8. 
  
100	  
40	  
12	   28	  
60	  
36	   24	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Given this new information, we again apply the standard Bayesian 
method as follows:  
1. Since 40% of all city buses run on Main Street, and since 80% of 
those buses are blue, then 32% of all city buses are blue and run 
through Main Street [0.4 * 0.8 = 0.32]; 
2. Since 60% of all city buses do not run down Main Street, and 
since 80% of those buses are blue, then 48% of all city buses do 
not run through Main Street and are blue [0.6 * 0.8 = 0.48]; 
3. Since 0.32 + 0.48 = 0.80, a total of 80% of city buses are blue; 
4. Lastly, since 0.32 divided by 0.80 = 0.4, there is a 40% posterior 
probability that a certain bus runs on Main Street, given that it is 
blue. 
Notice that the posterior probability in this example is the same as the 
prior probability. Furthermore, this will always be the case when the hit 
and miss rates are the same. In general, when both conditional 
probabilities are the same, the conditional probabilities end up exerting the 
same amount of force on our Bayesian update—meaning that our 
Bayesian update provides us with no new information from which to 
revise our original prior probability. 
In terms of the blue bus problem, if a bus is just as likely to be blue 
given that it runs on Main Street (the hit rate or first conditional 
probability) as it is likely to be blue given that it does not run on Main 
Street (the miss rate or second conditional probability), the fact that the 
defendant bus line owns all the blue buses in town does not provide any 
new information about whose bus caused the plaintiff’s accident. Thus, 
with no new information, we are unable to update or revise our prior 
probability. 
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Example #7 (visual format) 
We now present this example visually as follows: 
 
As in the previous two examples, there are more false alarms than hits: 
48 false alarms versus 32 hits. In Bayesian terms, since there are more 
false alarms than hits, a random blue bus is less likely to run on Main 
Street than a bus of another color. Given this observation, the plaintiff 
should not pass the “preponderance of the evidence” test. The larger lesson 
here is that defendants, not just plaintiffs, can potentially use Bayesian 
methods.  
Thus far, we have used frequency trees and frequency grids to visualize 
our Bayesian models. Next, we present an alternative visualization of our 
Bayesian approach to the blue bus problem. 
  
100	  
40	  
32	   8	  
60	  
48	   12	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H. An Alternative Visualization of the Bayesian Approach 
Here, we present an alternative visualization of the blue bus problem 
based on the work of Luke Muehlhauser and Eliezer Yudkowsky.49 
Consider the following diagram: 
 
The diagram conveys the following information: 
• The bar on the top of this diagram is divided between p(A) and 
p(not A), where “A” is the condition of being on Main Street. In 
brief, this bar shows the prior probability that a bus (of any 
color) runs on Main Street. Since the probability in this 
hypothetical example is 33%, the division between the two sides 
of the bar is just left of center.50 
• The slanted line in the middle of the diagram represents the 
effect of hits and misses, or the effect of the conditional 
probabilities, on the prior probability, where “X” is the 
condition of being blue. The first conditional probability, the hit 
rate, is p(X|A) (i.e., “the probability that a bus is blue given that 
it runs on Main Street”). Similarly, the second conditional 
 
 
 49. See Luke Muehlhauser, An Intuitive Explanation of Eliezer Yudkowsky’s Intuitive 
Explanation of Bayes’ Theorem (Dec. 18, 2010), http://commonsenseatheism.com/?p=13156 (last 
visited on Oct. 12, 2014). See also Eliezer S. Yudkowsky, An Intuitive Explanation of Bayesian 
Reasoning (June 4, 2006), available at http://yudkowsky.net/rational/bayes (last visited on Sept. 26, 
2014). The Bayesian diagram below appears in Yudkowsky. 
 50. If the prior probability in our example had been 50% instead of 40%, the division between 
the two sides would have appeared in the center. 
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probability is p(X|~A), or “the probability that a bus is blue 
given that it does not run on Main Street.” This is the rate of 
misses. Since the hit rate p(X|A) is greater than the miss rate 
p(X|~A) in this example, the middle line is slanted from left to 
right, and the degree of this slant reflects the probability 
regarding the color of a particular bus running on Main Street. 
• Finally, the bottom row represents the revised or posterior 
probability that a bus is blue and runs on Main Street, or p(X & 
A), as well as the posterior probability that a bus is blue and 
does not run on Main Street, p(X & ~A). 
Also, before proceeding, notice that the bar at the top of the diagram is 
much wider than the bar at the bottom. This differential occurs because the 
top bar refers to the collection of all buses that run or do not run on Main 
Street, while the bottom bar refers only to the collection of blue buses that 
run or do not run on Main Street.51 
Now, returning to the diagram, notice the differential in proportions 
between the left side of the top bar and the left side of the bottom bar. This 
differential tells us that the proportion of buses that are blue and that run 
on Main Street (the left side of the bottom bar) is somewhat larger than the 
proportion of all buses that run on Main Street (the left side of the top bar). 
Thus, based on the evidence in this example, the hit and miss rates p(X|A) 
and P(X|~A), we must update our posterior probability that a bus is on 
Main Street given that it is blue upwards—in this example, from 33% 
percent up to 59.6%. Although the plaintiff in the blue bus problem may 
not have seen the color of the bus that caused her to swerve, she knows 
that the accident occurred on Main Street, and the Bayesian updating in 
this example strongly supports her hypothesis that a blue bus caused her to 
swerve.  
Does this particular example pass the “preponderance of the evidence” 
test? This example ought to pass the preponderance test because in this 
case it is more likely than not that a blue bus caused the accident. 
IV. THE CASE FOR BAYES 
Thus far, we have restated the famous blue bus thought-experiment and 
have presented our alternative Bayesian visualization of the blue bus 
problem. But what about the general questions we posed at the beginning 
 
 
 51. See generally Muehlhauser, supra note 49. 
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of this paper regarding the role of mathematics and mathematical 
reasoning in law?52 Specifically, what larger lessons can we hope to learn 
from our simple Bayesian model of the blue bus problem? 
Recall the legal issue in Smith v. Rapid Transit and the question posed 
by the blue bus thought-experiment itself: the problem of probabilistic 
proof in legal trials. Specifically, what role should probabilistic proof play 
in the legal process? What role should the Bayesian methods proposed in 
this paper and by others play in adjudication?53 I shall conclude this paper 
by summarizing and discussing the main virtues of Bayesian reasoning 
generally and of my Bayesian approach to evidence.54 
A. What Bayes is Not 
To avoid confusion, we begin by stating what Bayesian reasoning is 
not. It is not a magic conjurer, Delphic oracle, or “veritable sorcerer.”55 
Bayesian reasoning is not a method for eliminating uncertainty; it is a 
method for measuring our level of uncertainty.56 Put another way, the 
Bayesian approach to evidence is not only a method of drawing 
inferences, but it is also a method of measuring the strength or weakness 
of such inferences. In the legal process context, the Bayesian approach is 
not a method for deciding the ultimate guilt or innocence of a defendant. 
Instead, it is a method for measuring or evaluating the strength of a party’s 
evidence of guilt or innocence, and thus Bayesian methods may not only 
be used offensively by a moving party (plaintiff or prosecutor) to measure 
the strength of his case; such methods can also be used defensively by a 
defendant to test or challenge the strength of the moving party’s case.  
 
 
 52. It is worth noting that these same questions were first raised two centuries ago by such 
intellectual giants as Pierre Simon Laplace and the Marquis de Condorcet. See generally, Bertsch 
McGrayne, supra note 1, at 27–28. Here, our focus is on the problem of probabilistic proof. 
 53. It is worth noting that Tribe’s original critique of mathematical proof in law (see Tribe, supra 
note 4) was a response to a paper proposing Bayesian methods in law. 
 54. For a more systematic explanation of Bayesian reasoning, see generally Yudkowsky, supra 
note 49. See also Colin Howson & Peter Urbach, Bayesian Reasoning in Science, 350 NATURE 371 
(1991). 
 55. Collins, 438 P.2d at 33. 
 56. See, e.g., Howson & Urbach, supra note 54, at 372 (Bayesian reasoning is a method of 
“characterizing a scientific conclusion about a hypothesis as a statement of its probability”); Fienberg 
& Schervish, supra note 7, at 773 (“Bayesian probability theory . . . provide[s] both a framework for 
quantifying uncertainty and methods for revising uncertainty measures in the light of acquired 
evidence.”). 
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B. A Legal Trial is Just a Test 
We often assume that trials are a search for the truth.57 Yet, truth itself 
is a probabilistic ideal, not an absolute one, since there might be different 
versions or interpretations of the truth. Moreover, from the perspective of 
a trial attorney and the litigating parties, a trial is a risk-taking activity, a 
game whose main object is to “win,” regardless of truth. Metaphorically 
speaking, then, a legal trial is more like poker and less like science.58  
Of course, it helps to have the truth on one’s side, but my point here is 
that having the truth on one’s side is neither a necessary nor sufficient 
condition for winning at trial (the ultimate goal of litigation from the 
perspective of the parties). Truth, too, is a probabilistic concept, for there 
can be competing conceptions of the truth in any given case.59 In law, this 
means that a legal trial is not a dispassionate or scientific search for truth. 
Rather, a legal trial is a bet or wager on which party’s story or version of 
the truth is more likely to be accepted as true. 
In sum, instead of a search for truth, a legal trial is a test—a test of the 
evidence one offers in support of one’s version of the truth. Thus, a legal 
trial is more like a medical test or a spam filter, but instead of testing for 
cancer, HIV, or spam, litigation simply tests the strength of the moving 
party’s case. In Anglo-American law, the moving party is either the State 
(e.g., the prosecution in a criminal case) or a private party (e.g., the 
plaintiff in a civil case), and when a prosecutor or plaintiff goes to trial, he 
is literally putting his allegations (his case) to the test. In either case, civil 
or criminal, the moving party must submit sufficient evidence to pass the 
relevant test. Sometimes the test is pass/fail (e.g., the preponderance of the 
evidence standard); sometimes the test requires a higher standard of 
evidence (e.g., the reasonable doubt standard). In either case, the question 
 
 
 57. See, e.g., Cheng, supra note 7, at 1273 (“the legal system’s purpose is to discover a single, 
stable ‘truth’ or narrative”). See also Thomas A. Mauet, Trial Techniques, 8th edition, New York: 
Aspen (2010), p. 24 (“A theory of the case is a clear, simple story of ‘what really happened’ from your 
point of view . . . Trials are in large part a contest to see which party’s version of ‘what really 
happened’ the jury will accept as more probably true”). In the criminal context, see Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963) (citation omitted). For an extended discussion of the Brady rule in 
criminal cases, see Robert Hochman, Brady v. Maryland and the Search for Truth in Criminal Trials, 
63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1673 (1996). 
 58. For a simple poker model of litigation, see Enrique Guerra-Pujol, The Poker-Litigation Game 
(Working Paper Series, Dec. 26, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2193993. For a risk-based analysis of litigation, see Tristan Barnett, Applying the Kelly 
Criterion to Lawsuits, 9 LAW, PROB. & RISK 139 (2010). 
 59. Cf. Cheng, supra note 7, at 1259 (“the preponderance standard [in civil cases] is better 
characterized as a probability ratio, in which the probability of the plaintiff’s story of the case is 
compared with the defendant’s story of the case”). 
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is the same: has the prosecution proven its case beyond a reasonable 
doubt? Or, has the plaintiff proven his case by a preponderance of the 
evidence? This, then, is what is meant when describing a trial as a test. 
C. A Test is Separate from Reality 
When we use a medical test, or a spam test, or a legal test, we must 
cognitively distinguish that the test is separate from the underlying 
hypothesis or event being tested. Put another way, “tests are not the 
event.”60 A spam filter tests for spam, but the spam test itself is separate 
from the event of actually having a spam message, and by the same token, 
a test for cancer or HIV is separate from the event of actually having 
cancer or HIV. Or, in the words of one Bayesian: 
Even a useful mammography test does not actually change [the 
underlying reality] whether or not a woman has cancer. She either 
has cancer or she doesn’t. Reality is not uncertain about whether or 
not the woman has cancer. We are uncertain about whether or not 
she has cancer. It is our information, our judgment, that is uncertain, 
not reality itself.61 
Likewise, a legal trial or “legal test” is separate from the underlying 
condition being tested: a defendant’s guilt or innocence. Again, the 
defendant either has or has not committed a wrongful act (e.g., a crime, a 
tort, a breach of contract, etc.).62 Reality itself is not uncertain about the 
defendant’s conduct. It is we (the jury or the trier or fact) who are 
uncertain about the defendant’s guilt or innocence.63 
As an aside, this point helps explain the logic of our Bayesian approach 
 
 
 60. This phrase is from Kalid Azad, An Intuitive (and Short) Explanation of Bayes’ Theorem 
(May 7, 2007), available at http://betterexplained.com/articles/an-intuitive-and-short-explanation-of-
bayes-theorem/ (last visited on Sept. 26, 2014). 
 61. Muehlhauser, supra note 49, at 8 in the pdf format, italics in original (explaining the ideas of 
Yudkowsky, supra note 49).  
 62. As our editors have pointed out, the legal elements of a wrongful act—that is, what 
constitutes a particular crime or tort—are human-constructed elements, since we ultimately define 
what elements constitute a tort or crime, such as “battery,” for example. As a result, the underlying 
metaphysical reality (e.g., “did this defendant commit a battery?”) might not congruently align with 
the human-defined elements of the wrongful act. In this case, stating that “a defendant either has or has 
not committed a crime” would present a false dichotomy. Nevertheless, there is no reason in principle 
why we could not apply Bayesian methods to the task of interpreting what behavior constitutes a 
wrongful act in the first place. That is, we could apply Bayesian methods to predict what interpretation 
of law is most likely to prevail in a given close case. 
 63. Even the practice of science, like litigation, is just a series of tests. There is a test for a given 
phenomenon, and there is the event of the phenomenon itself. See Azad, supra note 60. 
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to adjudication. A Bayesian or any probabilistic method for trying cases is 
not designed to tell us with 100% certainty whether a given defendant is 
guilty or innocent. No method or test could produce such perfect 
outcomes. Instead, our Bayesian approach is simply an alternative method 
for testing the strength of the moving party’s case, that is, for testing how 
likely the plaintiff or prosecutor has proven his or her case.  
D. All Tests are Imperfect 
Tests sometimes detect things that do not exist (false positives or “false 
alarms”) and miss things that do exist (false negatives or “misses”).64 
Consider spam filters, which are designed to detect spam or unwanted 
email messages. The problem is that no spam filter is perfect. Sometimes 
the spam net is cast too wide and some non-spam email messages fall into 
the spam filter and into one’s junk email folder; sometimes the spam net is 
not wide enough and spam messages get past the filter and into your 
regular inbox. 
By analogy, the same problem occurs in litigation. A “frivolous” civil 
case, or criminal case in which the prosecutor has “overcharged” the 
defendant, can be compared to spam. In a perfect legal system, judges and 
juries would be able to detect and distinguish frivolous claims from valid 
ones (in civil cases) and such superfluous criminal charges from 
substantial ones (in criminal cases). But judges and juries make mistakes. 
We all do. Sometimes judges dismiss valid claims (misses) and allow 
frivolous claims to go to trial (false alarms). Likewise, sometimes juries 
convict innocent men (false alarms) and allow the guilty to go free 
(misses). 
E. Why Bayes is Useful: It Puts Tests to the Test 
Bayesian methods are useful because they allow one to update and test 
one’s prior probability of a given event (e.g., x has cancer, y is a spam 
message, z committed a crime or a tort). In the case of a legal trial, the 
Bayesian approach is a formal method for updating one’s prior beliefs 
about a defendant’s guilt or innocence. Put another way, Bayesian 
reasoning is a method for testing the reliability and accuracy of a legal 
trial.65 It is a way of testing legal tests, a test of a test. This principle, the 
 
 
 64. As we noted in Part III above, the terms “false alarms” and “misses” were used by Engel and 
Gigerenzer. Engel & Gigerenzer, supra note 40, at 10. 
 65. See, e.g., Enrique Guerra-Pujol, A Bayesian Model of the Litigation Game, 4 EUR. J. LEGAL 
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idea that Bayes puts tests to the test, we believe is the most important one. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article represents a small first step in solving the problem of 
probabilistic proof in law. By focusing on a simple proof problem, the 
famous blue bus hypothetical, and by visualizing this problem using 
Bayesian methods, we have demonstrated the following lessons: 
• Probabilistic proof—like all forms of proof—can in principle be 
subjected to Bayesian testing given sufficient information about 
hits and misses. 
• Our simplified Bayesian testing procedure consists of 
comparing the number of hits and misses. 
• Our testing procedure measures the strength of the evidence 
being tested. 
• Visual presentation of a given evidence problem can be useful 
because it can simplify the problem. 
• But, to apply our test protocol, we need information about base, 
hit, and miss rates. 
In sum, legal scholars, lawyers, and judges should reconsider the 
potential usefulness of Bayesian methods at trial to test and evaluate the 
strength of probabilistic proof, instead of rejecting such proof altogether. 
To the extent law is nothing more than a prediction of what courts, juries, 
and legislators will do,66 the law of the future should be open to Bayesian 
methods. 
 
 
STUDIES 220 (2011). 
 66. See O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460–61 (1897) (“The 
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the 
law.”). 
 
